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I. INTRODUCTION
In Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,1 the Supreme Court of Canada for the first time
issued a declaration of Aboriginal title. The area to which the declaration applies is part
of the traditional territory of the Tsilhqot’in Nation, amounting to the land within the
claim area that they were able to prove, to the satisfaction of Justice Vickers at trial, had
been in their exclusive occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty in 1846. 2
The area claimed in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case was not subject to competing
claims by other Aboriginal peoples.3 However, as is well known, overlapping claims by
different Aboriginal groups are common in British Columbia,4 raising the issue of
whether any of the claimants can have title to those areas. The problem is that Aboriginal


I am very grateful to John Borrows, Julie Falck, Robert Hamilton, Mary Jane Mossman, Kathy Simo, and
Kerry Wilkins for reading a draft of this article and providing very helpful feedback. Needless to say, any
shortcomings or errors are entirely my own.
1
[2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
2
This is the year of the Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, which extended the boundary between their claimed territories in the Pacific Northwest along the
49th parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. Although the Supreme Court, in Delgamuukw
v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw] and Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1, accepted this
as the date of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over British Columbia, I think this date is problematic
for most of the province because the Crown was not in effective control at the time: see Kent McNeil,
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian Territorial Rights
in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed, The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in
the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 35-55.
3
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 6; David M Rosenberg, “10 Reasons Why the Tsilhqot’in
Succeeded”, paper delivered at the Affinity Institute Conference, The SCC Tsilhqot’in Decision:
Significance, Implications, and Practical Impact, Vancouver BC, 26 September 2014, at 7.
4
See Map of Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia, online: https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-BC/STAGING/texte-text/trynega_1100100021019_eng.pdf; Britsh
Columbia Treaty Commission Annual Report 2014, online:
http://www.bctreaty.net/files/pdf_documents/BCTC-Annual-Report-2014.pdf; Douglas R Eyford, A New
Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, Report on Renewing Canada’s Comprehensive Land
Claims Policy, released 2 April 2015, online: https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1426169199009/1426169236218, at 65-69.
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title depends on proof of exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown sovereignty.5
How then, it may be asked, can any Aboriginal claimants have title to areas where claims
overlap?
In some cases, this may be a matter of establishing appropriate boundaries based
on the historical facts where there are competing claims. This is a common situation in
both domestic property law and international law. When the parties agree on the location
of the boundary, that usually resolves the matter, at least between the parties.6 Otherwise,
the matter can be determined by a court, which can also happen where a boundary
agreement has to be interpreted or an agreed boundary has to be located on the ground.7
There is, however, another possibility where Aboriginal claimants are concerned,
namely joint Aboriginal title. In Delgamuukw v British Columbia,8 the Supreme Court
envisaged this possibility, without much elaboration. My goal in this article is to develop
the concept of joint Aboriginal title and suggest how it might apply to overlapping
claims. I will start by discussing the requirement of exclusive occupation that the
Supreme Court has applied to Aboriginal title and the Court’s brief observations on joint
title in Delgamuukw. I will then discuss how the common law has dealt with shared
exclusivity in the context of real property rights apart from Aboriginal title. Next, I will
examine American law on joint Aboriginal title. I will conclude by discussing how this
concept of joint title might apply in Canada and be used to resolve at least some
overlapping title claims.
In this article, I will not address the issue of how the Crown could acquire
sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples and underlying title to their lands without their
consent and without conquest.9 Likewise, I will leave aside the question of how
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 143, 155-57; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at paras 25-26, 47-49.
The boundary between the United Sates and Canada was settled in this way by a series of treaties between
the United States and Great Britain, principally the Treaty of Paris (1783), the Convention of Commerce
(1818), and the Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty, 1846: see Bruce Hutchison, The Struggle for the
Border (Don Mills, ON: Longman Canada, 1970); Norman L Nicholson, The Boundaries of the Canadian
Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979). Internationally, because of the importance of
stability of boundaries, boundary treaties can be binding on third party states: see Malcolm N Shaw,
International Law, 5th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 417.
7
International examples are El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute), ICJ
Reports 1992, 351; Libya/Chad, ICJ Reports 1994, 6; Botswana/Namibia case, ICJ Reports 1999, 1045.
8
Supra note 2.
9
On this, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia”
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537-96; Kent McNeil, “Factual and Legal Sovereignty in North America:
5
6
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Aboriginal groups are to be defined and identified for the purpose of specifying the
holders of Aboriginal title or other rights in relation to any particular lands.10 When
referring to the title or rights holders apart from specific cases, I will therefore use the
broad (and I hope neutral) term “Aboriginal group”, rather than terms like Aboriginal
people, Aboriginal nation, Indigenous people, First Nation, etc., as use of any of these
terms might beg the very question I wish to avoid at this time.11

II. THE REQUIREMENT OF EXCLUSIVE OCCUPATION

In the Delgamuukw decision, the Supreme Court declined to issue a declaration of
Aboriginal title because of the way the case had been pleaded and because the Court
disapproved of the trial judge’s treatment of the oral histories of the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en Nations.12 Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless wrote a lengthy judgment on
the sources, nature and content, proof, and constitutional protection of Aboriginal title.13
As mentioned earlier, Aboriginal title can be established by proof of exclusive occupation
of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. Regarding exclusivity, Lamer CJ
elaborated as follows:
Finally, at sovereignty, occupation must have been exclusive. The requirement for
exclusivity flows from the definition of aboriginal title itself, because I have
defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to exclusive use and occupation of
Indigenous Realities and Euro-American Pretensions”, in Julie Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly
and Patrick Wolfe, eds, Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press,
2013), 37-59; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2014).
10
Note, however, that in both Delgamuukw, supra note 2, and Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1, the
Gitksan, Wet’suwet’en, and Tsilhqot’in Nations were found to be the appropriate Aboriginal title
claimants. See especially the trial decision of Justice Vickers, Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,
[2008] 1 CNLR 112 at paras 437-72, affirmed in this regard by the BCCA, William v British Columbia,
[2012] 3 CNLR 333 at paras 51-57, 132-57 [William]. This issue also arises in some of the American cases
discussed in Part IV infra.
11
Although I prefer the internationally accepted term “Indigenous” rather than “Aboriginal”, in Canada
“Aboriginal” is generally used in legal contexts because it is the term used in s 2 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11, so to avoid confusion I have chosen to use it
in this article.
12
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 76-77, 107-08. Although the Court ordered a new trial, the case has
not been retried,
13
See “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title” and “Aboriginal Title as a
Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous
Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), at 10235 [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”] and 292-308.
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land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal
community which holds the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant
to that title. The proof of title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right.
Were it possible to prove title without demonstrating exclusive occupation, the
result would be absurd, because it would be possible for more than one aboriginal
nation to have aboriginal title over the same piece of land, and then for all of them
to attempt to assert the right to exclusive use and occupation over it.14
Lamer CJ made these remarks in the context of his discussion of the requirements
for proof of Aboriginal title by a single Aboriginal group. In that situation, the group’s
occupation of land at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty must have been exclusive
because, by his definition of Aboriginal title, the titleholders have “the right to exclusive
use and occupation of the land”.15 To me, this is not only logical but also in keeping with
common law principles relating to possession and exclusivity,16 discussed below. I think
the Supreme Court’s decision to define Aboriginal title as encompassing the right of
exclusive use and occupation was a major victory for Aboriginal peoples.17 The flip side
of this, however, is that the right of exclusive occupation has to be based on the fact of
exclusive occupation. As Lamer CJ pointed out, non-exclusive uses can give rise to more
limited Aboriginal rights,18 but the exclusivity of Aboriginal title requires proof of
exclusive occupation.
So what does exclusive occupation mean in the context of Aboriginal title? While
my focus here is on the exclusivity requirement, it is important to point out that
assessment of occupation has to take account of the way of life and traditional land uses
of the Aboriginal people in question, as “the common law concept of possession must be
sensitive to the realities of aboriginal society”.19 Among other things, “one must take into
account the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities,

14

Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para 155.
Ibid at para 117.
16
See also R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 57 [Marshall/Bernard].
17
See Kent McNeil, “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title”, in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 135-54,
where I argued against the more limited definition of Aboriginal title articulated by the majority of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1993), 104 DLR (4th) 470, the
decision appealed to the Supreme Court.
18
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 159; see also paras 138-39.
19
Ibid at para 156.
15
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and the character of the lands claimed”.20 This is consistent with the approach taken by
the Privy Council in appeals from Commonwealth countries where occupation of land
was an issue. For example, in Cadija Umma v S Don Manis Appu (an appeal from
Ceylon, now Sri Lanka), the Privy Council said that special weight had to be attached to
local judges’ evaluation of the evidence of occupation because they were familiar “with
the conditions of life and the habits and ideas of the people.”21 Taking local conditions
into account is simply an aspect of the broader principle that occupation depends on all
the circumstances, including the particular relationship the people concerned have with
the land.22
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Supreme Count unanimously affirmed and applied
Lamer CJ’s approach to occupation in Delgamuukw, specifying that sufficiency of
occupation “must be approached from both the common law perspective and the
aboriginal perspective”.23 Chief Justice McLachlin, who wrote the judgment, stated that
“[t]he aboriginal perspective focuses on laws, practices, customs and traditions of the
group”, and so “[t]he intensity and frequency of the use [of the land] may vary with the
characteristics of the aboriginal group asserting title and the character of the land over
which title is asserted.”24 She elaborated as follows:
To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal group in
question must show that it has historically acted in a way that would communicate
to third parties that it held the land for its own purposes. This standard does not
demand notorious or visible use akin to proving a claim for adverse possession,
but neither can the occupation be purely subjective or internal. There must be
evidence of a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in
Ibid at para 149, quoting Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 727
at 758.
21
[1939] AC 136 at 141-42. See also Wuta-Ofei v Danquah, [1961] 3 All ER 596 (PC) [Wuta-Ofei]; Powell
v McFarlane (1977), 38 P & CR 452 at 471 (Ch) [Powell]; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham, [2003] 1 AC
419 (HL).
22
In Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880), 5 App Cas 273 at 288 (HL), Lord O’Hagan stated: “The character
and value of the property, the suitable and natural mode of using it, the course of conduct which the
proprietor might reasonably be expected to follow with a due regard to his own interests – all these things,
greatly varying as they must, under various conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the
sufficiency of a possession.” See also Neill v Duke of Devonshire (1882), 8 App Cas 135 at 165-66 (HL);
Sherren v Pearson (1887), 14 SCR 581[Sherren]; Kirby v Cowderoy, [1912] AC 599 (PC) [Kirby]; Halifax
Power Co v Christie, (1915) 48 NSR 264 (NSSC) [Halifax Power]; Powell, supra note 21; Partington v
Musial (1998), 519 APR 228 at 234 (NSCA). For discussion and further references, see Kent McNeil,
Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), at 199-204 [McNeil, Common Law
Aboriginal Title].
23
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 34.
24
Ibid at paras 35, 37.
20
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acts of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that the
land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the exclusive
stewardship of the claimant group.25
The last sentence in this passage is particularly important because it indicates that
control and exercise of exclusive stewardship can be used to prove title. So while
physical presence and use can also be relied upon,26 acts of control, stewardship, and any
other acts communicating of an intention to hold the land for the Aboriginal group’s own
purposes are at least as relevant. This approach is also consistent with the common law
approach to adverse possession,27 though importantly the Court appropriately held that
the standard for proving occupation sufficient for Aboriginal title is lower than that
required for adverse possession, for the obvious reason that adverse possessors are known
wrongdoers whereas Aboriginal groups are not.28 Adopting the reasoning of Cromwell
JA (as he then was) in his Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in R v Marshall,29
McLachlin CJ agreed with his likening of “the sufficiency of occupation required to
establish Aboriginal title to the requirements for general occupancy at common law. A
general occupant at common law is a person asserting possession of land over which no
one else has a present interest or with respect to which title is uncertain.”30 McLachlin CJ
also explicitly rejected the site-specific approach to Aboriginal title taken by the Court of
Appeal in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case,31 deciding instead that title can be territorial by
relying again on Cromwell JA’s decision in R v Marshall, which she quoted with
approval:
Where, as here, we are dealing with a large expanse of territory which was not
cultivated, acts such as continual, though changing, settlement and wide-ranging
use for fishing, hunting and gathering should be given more weight than they
25

Ibid at para 38.
See ibid at para 42: “a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting,
fishing, trapping and foraging is ‘sufficient’ use to ground Aboriginal title, provided that such use, on the
facts of a particular case, evinces an intention on the part of the Aboriginal group to hold or possess the
land in a manner comparable to what would be required to establish title at common law.”
27
See cases cited in notes 21-22 supra.
28
See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2012) 91 Can Bar Rev
745-61 at 755-59 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada”].
29
218 NSR (2d) 78 at paras 135-38. Notably, Cromwell JA’s decision was overturned on appeal by the
SCC in a judgment authored by McLachlin CJ: Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16.
30
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 39. See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note
22 at 197-204.
31
William, supra note 10. For a critique of this aspect of the BCCA’s decision, see McNeil, “Aboriginal
Title in Canada”, supra note 28.
26
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would be if dealing with enclosed, cultivated land. Perhaps most significantly ... it
is impossible to confine the evidence to the very precise spot on which the cutting
was done: Pollock and Wright [infra note 51] at p. 32. Instead, the question must
be whether the acts of occupation in particular areas show that the whole area
was occupied by the claimant.32
Regarding the exclusivity requirement, in Delgamuukw Chief Justice Lamer once
again emphasized the necessity to take “the realities of aboriginal society” into account:
As with the proof of occupation, proof of exclusivity must rely on both the
perspective of the common law and the aboriginal perspective, placing equal
weight on each. At common law, a premium is placed on the factual reality of
occupation, as encountered by the Europeans. However, as the common law
concept of possession must be sensitive to the realities of aboriginal society, so
must the concept of exclusivity. Exclusivity is a common law principle derived
from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be imported into the concept
of aboriginal title with caution. As such, the test required to establish exclusive
occupation must take into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time
of sovereignty.33
The Chief Justice seems to have regarded “the intention and capacity to retain exclusive
control” as a key element.34 If this is demonstrated, the presence of other Aboriginal
groups on the land would not necessarily negate exclusivity because they could have
been trespassers or have entered the land with the permission of the Aboriginal title
claimants.35 In this context, if the claimants had trespass laws or laws allowing for the
granting of permissive entry, those laws would be further evidence of their exclusive
control over the land.36

32

R v Marshall, [2004] 1 CNLR 211 (NSCA) at para 138, quoted in Tsilhqotin Nation, supra note 1 at para
40 [my emphasis]. In Tsilhqot’in Nation at para 43, McLachlin CJ said that “this Court in Marshall;
Bernard did not reject a territorial approach”. See also para 56 and the quotation in note 26 supra. In his
concurring judgment in Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 196, La Forest J stated: “Some would also argue
that specificity requires exclusive occupation and use of the land by the aboriginal group in question. The
way I see it, exclusivity means that an aboriginal group must show that a claimed territory is indeed its
ancestral territory and not the territory of an unconnected aboriginal society.”
33
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 156.
34
Ibid, quoting McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 22 at 204.
35
This corresponds with the common law in other contexts where the presence of occasional trespassers
does not negate exclusive occupation: see Sherren, supra note 22 at 586, 595; Fowley Marine v Gafford,
[1968] 2 WLR 842 at 856 (CA); Earle v Walker (1971), 22 DLR (3d) 284 at 287 (Ont CA); Wallis’s
Holiday Camp v Shell-Mex, [1975] QB 94 at 115-17 (CA). See also Red House Farms Ltd v Catchpole
(1976), 244 EG 295 (CA), leave to appeal to the HL refused, where giving permission to others to hunt on
land was evidence of occupation. This case was cited with approval by McLachlin CJ in Marshall/Bernard,
supra note 16 at para 54.
36
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 157. See also per La Forest J at para 196.
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The Supreme Court revisited the issue of exclusivity of occupation in 2005 in R v
Marshall; R v Bernard.37 Delivering the majority judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin
affirmed that “[e]xclusive occupation means ‘the intention and capacity to retain
exclusive control’, and is not negated by occasional acts of trespass or the presence of
other aboriginal groups with consent.”38 Commenting on the meaning of exclusion, or
what she referred to as “exclusive control”,39 she elaborated:
The right to control the land and, if necessary, to exclude others from using it is
basic to the notion of title at common law. In European-based systems, this right
is assumed by dint of law. Determining whether it was present in a presovereignty aboriginal society, however, can pose difficulties. Often, no right to
exclude arises by convention or law. So one must look to evidence. But evidence
may be hard to find. The area may have been sparsely populated, with the result
that clashes and the need to exclude strangers seldom if ever occurred. Or the
people may have been peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by
sharing rather than exclusion. It is therefore critical to view the question of
exclusion from the aboriginal perspective. To insist on evidence of overt acts of
exclusion in such circumstances may, depending on the circumstances, be
unfair.40
In light of these difficulties, she concluded:
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to establish aboriginal
title. All that is required is demonstration of effective control of the land by the
group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have
excluded others had it chosen to do so. The fact that history, insofar as it can be
ascertained, discloses no adverse claimants may support this inference. This is
what is meant by the requirement of aboriginal title that the lands have been
occupied in an exclusive manner.41
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin repeated the observations on
exclusivity made in Delgamuukw and Marshall/Bernard, affirming that “[e]xclusivity
should be understood in the sense of intention and capacity to control the land.”42 She
remarked that “[w]hether a claimant group had the intention and capacity to control the
land at the time of sovereignty is a question of fact for the trial judge and depends on

37

Supra note 16.
Ibid at para 57, quoting Delgamuukw at para 156.
39
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16 at para 63.
40
Ibid at para 64.
41
Ibid at para 65.
42
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 48.
38
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various factors such as the characteristics of the claimant group, the nature of other
groups in the area, and the characteristics of the land in question.”43 She concluded:
The trial judge found that the Tsilhqot’in, prior to the assertion of sovereignty,
repelled other people from their land and demanded permission from outsiders
who wished to pass over it. He concluded from this that the Tsilhqot’in treated the
land as exclusively theirs. There is no basis upon which to disturb that finding.44
I think it is significant that the evidence McLachlin CJ seems to have regarded as more
important in this context was evidence of control, not evidence of use. This is consistent
with the common law, where expression of an intention to own and control, even where
there is scant or no use of the land, can amount to occupation resulting in title.45
Turning our attention to the issue of shared exclusivity and joint Aboriginal title,
Chief Justice Lamer’s observations in Delgamuukw need to be quoted in full:
In their submissions, the appellants pressed the point that requiring proof of
exclusive occupation might preclude a finding of joint title, which is shared
between two or more aboriginal nations. The possibility of joint title has been
recognized by American courts: United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co.,
314 U.S. 339 (1941). I would suggest that the requirement of exclusive occupancy
and the possibility of joint title could be reconciled by recognizing that joint title
could arise from shared exclusivity. The meaning of shared exclusivity is wellknown to the common law. Exclusive possession is the right to exclude others.
Shared exclusive possession is the right to exclude others except those with whom
possession is shared. There clearly may be cases in which two aboriginal nations
lived on a particular piece of land and recognized each other's entitlement to that
land but nobody else’s. However, since no claim to joint title has been asserted
here, I leave it to another day to work out all the complexities and implications of
joint title, as well as any limits that another band’s title may have on the way in
which one band uses its title lands.46
In his concurring judgment, Justice La Forest also acknowledged the possibility of joint
title, stating even more briefly:
I recognize the possibility that two or more aboriginal groups may have occupied
the same territory and used the land communally as part of their traditional way of
43

Ibid.
Ibid at para 58.
45
See especially Kirby, supra note 22; Halifax Power, supra note 22; Wuta-Ofei, supra note 21. In each of
these cases, giving notice to others of an intention to own and control the land through paying taxes or
marking boundaries was sufficient to establish occupation and title.
46
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 158. Note, however, that while Lamer CJ was correct in stating that
the “possibility of joint title has been recognized by American courts”, the case he cited, United States v
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co, 314 US 339 (1941) [Santa Fe Pacific Railroad], did not deal with joint title.
See discussion of American law in Part IV infra.
44
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life. In cases where two or more groups have accommodated each other in this
way, I would not preclude a finding of joint occupancy.47
In Marshall/Bernard, McLachlin CJ referred to the paragraph on joint title from
Lamer CJ’s judgment in Delgamuukw and affirmed without elaboration that “[s]hared
exclusivity may result in joint title.”48 She did not mention joint title in Tsilhqot’in
Nation, no doubt because shared exclusivity was not an issue in that case.49 We therefore
need to examine more closely the two sources of authority for shared exclusivity and
joint title mentioned by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw, namely the common law and
American law.
III. SHARED EXCLUSIVITY IN THE COMMON LAW

In the common law, possession is exclusive in the sense that there can be only one
possession of the same parcel of land at any given time. If two persons are in dispute over
the possession of a parcel of land, they cannot both have possession.50 In this situation, a
court has to choose between them, draw a boundary, or decide that neither has
possession. If each can point to current activities on the land as evidence of his or her
possession, a court will generally award possession to the one who can show a better
title.51 If neither has a title (e.g., by grant, conveyance, testamentary disposition, or
descent), and they both rely on their alleged possession, one of them will need to show
possession to the exclusion of the other. If neither of them can do so, then possession
cannot be accorded to either because it must be exclusive.52 There can thus be no shared
exclusivity by persons who dispute the possession with one another. Shared exclusivity

47

Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 196.
Marshall;Bernard, supra note 16 at para 57. At para 54, McLachlin CJ also stated: “the common law
recognizes that exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that recognize shared title to the
same parcel of land: Delgamuukw, at para. 158.” See also Nunavik Inuit v. Canada (Minister of Canadian
Heritage), [1998] 4 CNLR 68 at 101 ( para 120) (FCTD), where the possibility of joint title was mentioned.
49
See supra note 3 and text.
50
See Kynock v Rowlands, [1912] 1 Ch 527 at 533-34 (CA) [Kynock]; Bligh v Martin, [1968] 1 All ER
1157 at 1160 (Ch).
51
See Jones v Chapman (1849), 2 Exch Rep 803 at 821 (Ex Ch); Kynock, supra note 50 at 533-34. In this
situation, the maxim “possession follows title” applies: see Frederick Pollock and Robert Samuel Wright,
An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 24-25; John M Lightwood,
A Treatise on Possession of Land (London: Stevens & Sons, 1894), 36-39.
52
See Pollock and Wright, supra note 51 at 20-21; Lightwood, supra note 51 at 14-15.
48
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can exist only in situations where the single possession is held by co-possessors whose
claims are not in conflict with one another.
The common law concept of shared exclusivity therefore applies where two or
more persons concurrently have possession of the same parcel of land.53 It usually arises
in situations where there is either a joint tenancy or tenancy in common that is vested in
possession.54 In most cases, these forms of co-ownership of interests in land are created
either by an inter vivos grant or conveyance, or by a testamentary devise or intestacy, to
two or more persons of an interest in land. In the case of a joint tenancy the tenants have
“a unified interest in the whole” that they hold equally in every respect, whereas tenants
in common have undivided fractional shares that can be either equal or unequal. 55 In
addition, joint tenants enjoy a right of survivorship, meaning that when one of them dies
the entire interest continues to be vested in the surviving joint tenant or tenants.56 As
tenants in common do not have a right of survivorship, their interests will be distributed
by will or intestacy when they die. Most importantly for our purposes, however, joint
tenancy and tenancy in common both entail “unity of possession”, so that in each case all
the tenants have “undivided rights to possession of the whole of the relevant property” as
against everyone else.57 With regard to possession, therefore, there is no distinction
between the shared exclusivity enjoyed by joint tenants and tenants in common: in both
common law forms of co-ownership, “each co-owner is as much entitled to possession of
any part of the land as the others.”58
53

See Powell, supra note 21 at 470; Mary Jane Mossman and Philip Girard, Property Law Cases and
Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014), 522-23.
54
The common law distinguishes between estates in land that are vested in possession, and estates that are
vested in interest (e.g., a life estate vested in possession, and a remainder in fee simple vested in interest).
The former entail a right of immediate possession, whereas the latter entail a right to future possession
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While joint tenancies and tenancies in common are usually created by a grant,
conveyance, will or intestacy, they can also arise from occupancy (taking possession of
unowned land), which is particularly relevant to our discussion because the common law
test for sufficiency of occupation to acquire a title by occupancy is the test the Supreme
Court found relevant for proof of Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in Nation.59 Because the
common law doctrine of tenure deemed all land in England to have been originally
possessed and therefore owned by the King, acquisition of title by taking possession of
unowned land was generally impossible except in the anomalous situation where a pur
autre vie estate (an estate for the life of another) became vacant as a result of the death of
the life tenant before the death of the cestui que vie (the person whose life measured the
estate’s duration).60 Prior to statutory reform, the first person who took possession of the
land after the death of the life tenant acquired the pur autre vie estate by occupancy for
the rest of the cestui que vie’s life. Where two or more persons acting together entered as
occupants, they would have acquired the vacant life estate as co-owners (probably as
joint tenants61) and shared the possession equally.
Similarly, adverse possessors who act in concert generally acquire an estate as
joint tenants62 (though the test for acquisition of adverse possession is more onerous than
the test for occupancy because the possession is initially wrongful63). However, in either
situation if the occupants or adverse possessors agreed among themselves that they
should hold the estate as tenants in common, a court might decide that they hold the land

Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 39.
See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 22 at 11-13; Derek Mendes da Costa, Richard J
Balfour and Eileen E Gillese, Property Law Cases, Text and Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1990), 14:4.
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While I am not aware of any authority directly on this point, it is supported by the common law’s
preference for joint tenancies (see Mossman and Girard, supra note 53 at 527) and judicial decisions
holding that adverse possessors take as joint tenants: see cases cited in note 62 infra.
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See Ward v Ward (1871), LR 6 Ch App 789 (CA); Bolling v Hobday (1882), 31 WR 9 (Ch); In Re
Livingston Estate (1901), 2 OLR 381 (Div Ct); Smith v Savage, [1906] 1 Ir R 469 (Ch); Coady and Coady
Estate v Coady and Coady Estate (1983), 48 Nfld & PEIR 355 (Nfld SC, TD). Compare Afton Band of
Indians v Attorney General of Nova Scotia (1978), 29 NSR (2d) 226 (NSSC, TD), where the members of an
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generally had used the lands “in common” for various purposes, which would have led him to decide that
the Band had title, were it capable of holding property. However, as he found the Band itself lacked the
legal personality necessary to hold property, “title had to vest and did vest in members of the Band as
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in that way.64 However, as mentioned above this would not affect the shared exclusivity
of their right of possession, as unity of possession applies equally to joint tenancies and
tenancies in common. The important point is that two or more persons who acquire an
interest in land by taking possession have shared exclusivity, the meaning of which Chief
Justice Lamer said in Delgamuukw is “well-known to the common law” and which can be
adapted to apply to joint Aboriginal title.65
We will consider the relevance of this body of common law to joint Aboriginal
title in Part V of this article, but before doing so we need to discuss the law on joint title
of Indian nations in the United States, as that is the second source of authority for joint
title that Chief Justice Lamer referred to in Delgamuukw.

IV. JOINT ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE UNITED STATES

We will start with a brief outline of American law on Aboriginal or Indian title
generally,66 and then turn to joint title.67 However, it is important to point out at the outset
that, unlike the Canadian cases of Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation, the cases dealing
with joint Aboriginal title in the United States have generally involved claims for
compensation for lands taken by the United States without fair payment, not applications
for declarations of title. This is because most of these American cases originated in
claims brought before the Indian Claims Commission (ICC),68 a statutory body created in
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Again, I know of no direct authority for this. However, joint tenants can sever their joint tenancy in
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Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 158. See text at note 46 supra for complete quotation.
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For further discussion and comparison of American law on Aboriginal title with Canadian, Australian,
and New Zealand law, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change
(Leichhardt, NSW: Federation Press, 2008); Kent McNeil, “Judicial Perspectives on Indigenous Land
Rights in the Common Law World”, in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai, and Kent McNeil, eds,
Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009),
257-83; Ulla Secher, Aboriginal Customary Law: A Source of Common Law Title to Land (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2014).
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Created by the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 60 Stat 1049.
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1946 to provide compensation for past wrongs and unfair dealing by the United States.69
As the only remedy the ICC could grant was a monetary award, neither declarations of
title nor restoration of lands could be ordered. Nonetheless, the cases examined here,
involving mainly appeals to the Court of Claims from ICC decisions, do provide insight
into American law on exclusive occupation and joint title that could assist Canadian
courts in resolving over-lapping claims.
As in Canada, Aboriginal title in the United States is based on exclusive
occupation of land.70 However, while this occupation must have been “for a long time”,71
it need not have pre-dated European or even American assertion of sovereignty. 72 Also,
Aboriginal title in the United States can be held either communally or individually.73 It
includes the natural resources on and under the land,74 as does Aboriginal title in
Canada.75 However, unlike in Canada, for constitutional purposes it is non-proprietary
See Sandra C Danforth, “Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Commission” (1973) 49 North
Dakota L Rev 359-403; Imre Sutton, ed, Irredeemable America: The Indians’ Estate and Land Claims
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); Harvey D Rosenthal, Their Day in Court: A
History of the Indian Claims Commission (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990).
70
See cases cited infra in notes 71-73; Michael J Kaplan, “Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to
Indian Lands” (1979, updated 2003) LEXSEE 41 ALR Fed 42; Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
Nell Jessup Newton ed (New Providence, RI: LexisNexis, 2012), §15.04[2] at 999-1004, §15.05 at 1015-17
[Cohen’s Handbook].
71
Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v United States, 161 Ct Cl 189 at 202, 205-7 (1963) [Sac and
Fox Tribe 1963], cert denied 375 US 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon v United States, 177 Ct Cl 184 at 194 (1966) [Confederated Tribes]; United States v Pueblo of San
Ildefonso, 513 F 2d 1383 at 1394 (1975, Ct Cl) [Pueblo of San Ildefonso]; Seneca Nation of Indians v New
York, 206 F Supp 2d 448 at 503 (2002), WDNY). In Confederated Tribes at 194, Durfee J said: “The time
requirement, as a general rule, cannot be fixed at a specific number of years. It must be long enough to have
allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic territory so as not to make the Claims Commission
Act ‘an engine for creating aboriginal title in a tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a few
years before’” (quoting from Sac and Fox Tribe 1963 at 206).
72
Aboriginal title could therefore be acquired after American acquisition of sovereignty: see Cramer v
United States, 261 US 219 (1923) [Cramer]; United States v Seminole Indians, 180 Ct Cl 375 at 387 (1967)
[Seminole Indians]; Sac and Fox Tribe v United States, 383 F 2d 991 at 996-69 (1967, Ct Cl) [ Sac and Fox
Tribe 1967], cert denied 389 US 900 (1967); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v United States,
490 F 2d 935 at 941-42 (1974, Ct Cl) [Turtle Mountain Band]. Compare Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v
South Dakota, 796 F 2d 241 (1986, 8th Cir CA), cert denied 107 S Ct 3228 (1987).
73
See Cramer v United States, supra note 72 at 227-29; Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, supra note 46 at 34546; United States v Dann, 105 S Ct 1058 at 1065 (1985); United States v Kent, 912 F 2d 277 (1990, 9th Cir
CA).
74
See Ogden v Lee, 6 Hill 546 (1844, NYSC), affirmed sub nom Fellows v Lee, 5 Denio 628 (1846, NY Ct
of Errors); United States v Paine Lumber Co, 206 US 467 (1907);United States v Shoshone Tribe, 304 US
111 at 116-17 (1938); United States v Klamath & Moadac Tribes, 304 US 119 at 122-23 (1938); Miami
Tribe v United States, 175 F Supp 926 at 942 (1959, Ct Cl); United States v Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F
2d 786 at 796 (1968, Ct Cl); United States ex rel Chunie v Ringrose, 788 F 2d 638 at 642 (1986, 9th Cir
CA).
75
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 116-24.
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until recognized by treaty or statute, and so is not protected by the Fifth Amendment to
the US Constitution that, among other things, requires that just compensation be paid
when private property is taken for public purposes.76
The occupation upon which Aboriginal title in the United States is based must
have been exclusive in the sense that the Aboriginal group claiming title must have been
the only ones who occupied the land. Accordingly, if the land in question was used by
two or more tribes who were rivals or had no connection with one another, none of them
would have Aboriginal title. In United States v Santa Fe Pacific Railroad (the only
American case referred to by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw in the context of proof of
Aboriginal title), Douglas J stated:
Occupancy necessary to establish aboriginal possession is a question of fact to be
determined as any other question of fact. If it were established as a fact that the
lands in question were, or were included in, the ancestral home of the Walapais in
the sense that they constituted definable territory occupied exclusively by the
Walapais (as distinguished from lands wandered over by many tribes), then the
Walapais had “Indian title”.77
In assessing whether Indian use of the land amounted to occupation, American
courts have taken their manner of life into account. In an early decision, Baldwin J
expressed the opinion of the Supreme Court that Indian occupation was to be “considered
with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in
their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites”.78 Thus, as long as only one
Indian tribe or nation was using the land, the manner in which they used it does not seem
to matter.79 So tribes that American courts described as “nomadic” have been held to
have Aboriginal title to lands they used on a regular basis in accordance were their ways
76

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272 (1955) [Tee-Hit-Ton Indians]. For a powerful critique
of the Supreme Court’s exclusion of Aboriginal title from this constitutional protection, see Nell Jessup
Newton, “At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered” (1980) 31 Hastings LJ 1215. See
also Steven John Bloxham, “Aboriginal Title, Alaskan Native Property Rights, and the Case of the Tee-HitTon Indians” (1980) 8 Am Indian L Rev 299; McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 22 at 25967.
77
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, supra note 46 at 345. See Oneida Indian Nation v County of Oneida, 414 US
661 at 667-74 (1974), and County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 US 226 at 235-36 (1985), for
useful overviews of US case law, including Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, on Indian or Aboriginal title.
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Mitchel v United States, 9 Pet (34 US) 711 at 746 (1835).
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In Worcester v Georgia, 6 Pet (31 US) 515 at 559 (1832), Marshall CJ said the “Indian nations had
always been considered … as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial”. This was
confirmed by the Supreme Court in Holden v Joy, 17 Wall (84 US) 211 at 243 (1872). See also Seminole
Indians, supra note 72 at 383-86.
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of life.80 Moreover, this would include “seasonal or hunting areas over which the Indians
had control even though those areas were only used intermittently.”81
Disputes over the existence of Aboriginal title in the United States have related
mainly to lands that are located between the uncontested lands of two or more Indian
tribes or other groups. American courts have indicated that, depending on the facts, there
are three ways of resolving these disputes. First, the lands can be divided between the
groups, so that each receives the land where its use predominated.82 Secondly, if the lands
in question were visited, used, or fought over by two or more groups without one of them
prevailing and establishing its exclusive occupation, then none of them would have
Aboriginal title.83 Finally, if two or more groups with some kind of connection used the
same lands in an amicable rather than an adversarial fashion to the exclusion of other
groups, they could have joint Aboriginal title.84 While there is thus no doubt that joint
Aboriginal title can exist in the United States, examination of the American case law
reveals that the nature of the connection Aboriginal groups must have to enjoy joint title
is not entirely clear.
In Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v United
States, Durfee J, delivering the opinion of the Court of Claims, stated that “[j]oint and
amicable possession of the property by two or more tribes or groups will not defeat
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United States v Kagama, 118 US 375 at 381 (1886); Cramer, supra note 72 at 227; Northwestern Bands
of Shoshone Indians v United States, 324 US 335 at 338-40 (1945); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States,
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See Sac and Fox Tribe, supra note 71 at 202 n11; Confederated Tribes, supra note 71 at 194 n6; Iowa
Tribe, supra note 83 at 394-96; Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 72 at 944; Pueblo of San Ildefonso,
supra note 72 at 1394-95; Strong, supra note 81 at 561-62; Uintah Ute Indians v United States, 28 Fed Cl
768 at 785, 787 n21 (1993) [Uintah Ute Indians]. For discussion, see Kaplan, supra note 70, § 3b,
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‘Indian title’.”85 Later in his judgment, he clarified that he was not deciding a joint title
case, as there was insufficient evidence that usage by a neighbouring group was on a
“guest-host” basis.86 He nonetheless criticized the ICC for apparently denying title to
some land “because of its usage as a common subsistence area by more than one band of
Indians” who belonged to the same cultural group.87 For Durfee J, the issue therefore
seems to have been the definition of the claimant group, rather than joint title. He stated:
To prevent recovery for all the lands claimed to be used collectively by the
Wayampam [the claimant group], there must be substantial evidence that the
various Wayampam bands not only did not constitute a single political unit, but
also that they were not an identifiable group or tribe in the ethnic or cultural
sense.88
In other words, Aboriginal title can vest in one ethnic or cultural group that collectively
used lands, without imposing an additional requirement that they “constitute a single
political unit”. That Durfee J was concerned here with the identity of the titleholding
group rather than with joint title is demonstrated as well by his reliance upon the
following quotation from Hualapai Tribe v United States:
Assuming for the moment that the Hualapai were not a tribe in a political sense,
we have a people who, all ethnologists agree, spoke the same language, had a
common culture, intermarried, made common use of the lands away from their
settlements, shared their own territories, engaged in common economic activities
and considered themselves one people. Such factors make the Hualapai an
identifiable group and a land-owning entity.89
Nonetheless, in Iowa Tribe of the Iowa Reservation v United States, the Court of
Claims, in a per curiam judgment, said this in reference to the finding of the ICC in the
case:
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Confederated Tribes, supra note 71 at 194 n6.
Ibid at 198. I find Durfee J’s use of the term “guest-host” to be confusing in this context, as it suggests a
situation where one group had given permission to another to use the lands, which would support a finding
of Aboriginal title in the group giving permission rather than a finding of joint title: see supra note 81.
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Ibid at 206. See also 210, where he said the case had to be remanded to the ICC to reconsider “their
finding with regard to common usage”.
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Ibid at 206.
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11 Ind Cl Comm 458 at 474 (1967), quoted ibid at 206 n22. At 206 n21 Durfee J also quoted a passage
from Lummi Tribe v United States, 5 Ind Cl Comm 525 at 546 (1957): “If a group of village entities speak
the same dialect, move about more or less together in search of subsistence and retain a hold on the same
general area of land for their homes, then … they should be considered an entity capable of prosecuting a
claim and establishing their right thereto as a group.”
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The Commission was not wrong in refusing to find such joint acquisition here.
The Iowas and the Sac and Fox did not consider themselves, and were not treated,
as a single or closely integrated entity, but rather as separate political groups
which were friends or allies (for the most part). Their use of the same lands may
have been in common – like much of Indian use of the midwestern and western
regions – but the Commission could properly decide that it was not proved to be
truly joint, and therefore that each separate tribe’s claim to Indian title would have
to be tested on its own distinct basis.90
One can read this passage simply as a refusal by the Court to interfere with a factual
finding of the Commission that was supported by substantial evidence. 91 However, it
seems to me that the Court lacked a clear sense of the distinction drawn in Confederated
Tribes between a situation of joint title, which apparently could be held by neighbouring
groups that did not form a cultural unit, and a situation involving identification of a group
that displayed sufficient cultural cohesion (if not political unity) to be a single
landholding entity.
In Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v United States, the Court of
Claims affirmed that two groups in “joint and amicable” occupation would have joint title
if there was “extensive cooperation between them.”92 Significantly, the Court said that
joint title could arise between an Indian band and a “mixed blood” (Métis) band.93 On the
facts, the Court found that the full and mixed blood Chippewas were both organized as
bands, lived independently of “white social and political institutions”, and often hunted
together.94 It nonetheless refused to interfere with the decision of the ICC that, “based on
political, social and economic factors, these full and mixed bloods should be considered
members of a larger Indian group”.95 In other words, as in Confederated Tribes, this was
a case where title was vested in a larger entity that included these groups, rather than in
the groups as joint titleholders.96
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Iowa Tribe, supra note 83 at 370.
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In United States v Pueblo of San Ildefonso97 the Court of Claims held that joint
Aboriginal title had actually been acquired, in that case by two Indian Pueblos, Santo
Domingo and San Filipe, in New Mexico. The lands in question are adjacent to lands
granted to the two Pueblos for their common use by the Spanish Crown in 1770.98 Durfee
J, delivering the unanimous opinion, stated that “this court has acknowledged, on several
occasions, that two or more tribes or groups might inhabit a region in joint and amicable
possession without destroying the ‘exclusive’ nature of their use and occupancy, and
without defeating Indian title.”99 He then dealt with the argument of the government of
the United States that joint title could only be held by groups “so closely allied or
integrated in their land use and occupancy that they [had] in fact become virtually one
land using entity.”100 Durfee J rejected this argument, observing that “[t]here are no
holdings of this court which say that two Indian tribes or groups, each a separate ‘entity’
and each with its own separate lands, can never assert joint ownership to other lands
which are commonly used and occupied.”101 He then clarified the Court’s remarks on the
matter of joint title in Iowa Tribe:102
On the record before us in Iowa Tribes, supra, we held that the Iowas and the Sac
and Fox may have used lands in common, but that the Commission could properly
decide, on the basis of the evidence before it, that their occupancy was not proved
to be truly joint, and therefore that each separate tribe’s claims to Indian title
as a joint title case is also revealed by the fact that it was not mentioned in the Court’s decisions just nine
and eleven months later in Pueblo of San Ildefonso, supra note 71 at 1394-95, and Strong, supra note 81,
per Cowan CJ at 561, where the Court’s other decisions referring to joint title were cited). In response to
the US Government’s argument that the Teton and Yanktonais Sioux had not shown which lands east of the
Missouri River had been used exclusively by each of them, Cowen CJ, for the majority at 472,
distinguished cases like Iowa Tribe, supra note 83, which involved “competing groups which claimed the
same territory”, and stated: “However, the Teton and Yanktonais are not antagonists competing for the
same territory. The award here is to the Docket 74 Sioux who are the legitimate representatives of the
Teton and Yanktonais on whose behalf this action is asserted. All the Docket 74 Sioux, except the Sioux of
the Santee Reservation, are comprised at least in part of Yanktonais and Teton descendants or both. The
Government has no right to complain because the descendants chose to assert the joint interest of their
ancestors rather than compete for separate interests.” [emphasis in original]
97
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without preference to either of the Pueblos”: ibid at 1392. The Pueblos thought that the grant included the
lands in dispute in the case, but an earlier claim on that basis had been narrowly rejected by the Court of
Private Land Claims in 1898: ibid at 1395-96.
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would have to be tested on its own distinct basis. The Iowa Tribes decision did
not purport to set down any rule that two or more tribes must first conclusively
prove that they are a single or closely integrated entity before they can claim joint
ownership of land. In our view, the Commission correctly held that the complete
merger of two or more tribes into one is not a prerequisite for claiming joint
aboriginal title.103
In Pueblo of San Ildefonso, the factual evidence of joint use was fortified by the
belief of the two Pueblos that the lands in question had been granted to them by the
Spanish Crown as their joint property in 1770. Durfee J accordingly concluded:
The factual picture which has emerged here adds up to significantly more than
mere use and occupancy of a particular area by two or more tribes at the same
time. These two pueblos had a joint Spanish grant which they believed to
encompass a large area, and although the Court of Private Land Claims did not
validate the entire claim, it did validate an area contiguous to the 8,600-acre tract
in issue – hence there was a substantial objective basis for the Indians’ belief that
they jointly owned the disputed land.104
The last Court of Claims’ decision on joint Aboriginal title that I have found was
handed down in 1975 in Strong v United States.105 Cowen CJ, for the Court, stated:
Although normally no tribe will be deemed to have proven aboriginal title when
others used and occupied the land in question, there is a “built-in exception” to
the “exclusivity” requirement. Actually, this “exception” merely creates a method
of analysis of “exclusivity” in certain rare situations. In the past, the court has
held on several occasions that two or more tribes or groups might inhabit an area
in “joint and amicable” possession without erasing the “exclusive” nature of their
use and occupancy…. To qualify for treatment under “joint and amicable”
occupancy, the relationship of the Indian groups must be extremely close. We
described just such a relationship in Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl.
at 16, 383 F. 2d at 995, as follows:
Originally the Sac and Fox Nation consisted of two separate and
identifiable tribes of Indians belonging to the Algonquin stock. Around
1735, due to their mutual hostility and conflict with the French, they
formed a close and intimate alliance, politically and socially, so that from
thence forward they have been dealt with and referred to as a single
nation both in their relationship with other Indian tribes and in treaty
negotiations and other matters with the United States. [Cowan CJ’s
emphasis]106
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I have difficulty reconciling Cowan CJ’s opinion that, for “joint and amicable”
occupation to exist, the relationship between the groups must have been “extremely
close” (like that of the Sac and Fox, which seems to have involved a merger into a “single
nation”), with the Court’s decision in Pueblo of San Ildefonso.107 In the latter case,
decided just two months before Strong, Durfee J held that joint title could arise even
though the groups were not “a single or closely integrated entity”. 108 In that case, the
Santo Domingo and San Filipe Pueblos were held to have joint title to lands located
between their Pueblos, even though they remained separate and did not merge into a
single nation. As Cowan CJ referred to Pueblo of San Ildefonso in Strong and did not
express disagreement with it, I think his comments on joint title in the passage quoted
above need to be treated with caution. If taken literally, they would actually eliminate the
possibility of joint title, as the Sac and Fox Nation held their Aboriginal title lands as a
single entity, not as joint titleholders.109 Moreover, we have seen that, in Confederated
Tribes110 and Turtle Mountain Band,111 the Court of Claims held that groups with cultural
ties who used the same lands in common but lacked political unity would nonetheless
have a single Aboriginal title vested in a larger entity encompassing those groups.112 As
the Sac and Fox had “formed a close and intimate alliance, politically and socially,”113
they were more closely connected than the groups in those two cases. To suggest, as
Cowan CJ did in Strong, that for joint title to arise there must be the kind of relationship
that existed between the Sac and Fox is therefore inconsistent with the approach the
Court formerly took to identification of the titleholding entity and to joint title. Cowan CJ
nonetheless went on to hold that most of the claims to joint title in Strong failed because
the groups did not have a sufficiently close relationship to be in joint and amicable
occupation.114 Where so-called joint title did exist, apparently the holders of that title
were so closely connected as to have been a single landholding entity.115
107
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To conclude this discussion of the degree of connection necessary for two or more
groups to hold joint title, I think one first has to identify the group or groups that may
have title. If two or more groups were so closely connected, either culturally and socially
or politically, that they formed a single entity that used and controlled lands in common,
joint title would not exist (despite what Cowan CJ said in Strong) because a single
landholding unit would have title.116 In my opinion, true joint title arises only in a case
like Pueblo of San Ildefonso where two or more distinct groups amicably used the same
lands to the exclusion of all other groups. There would be no need for them to have been
culturally or politically linked, as they would be separate landholding entities. The focus
of the inquiry would therefore be on their relationship in the context of land use and
control. If they had an explicit agreement or implicit understanding that they both could
occupy and use the lands, and did jointly and amicably occupy and use them to the
exclusion of others, they would have been in control of those lands in a way that would
be sufficient for a single Aboriginal title to vest in each of them concurrently. Put another
way, there would have to be both a common intention to occupy jointly and exclusively,
and fulfilment of that intention by actual joint and exclusive use and control of the land.
It was that kind of factual situation that led the Court to conclude that joint title had been
established in Pueblo of San Ildefonso.117 In my view, this approach resolves the
confusion created by Cowan CJ’s judgment in Strong in a way that is consistent with the
Court of Claims’ earlier judgments on joint title.118
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This interpretation is also consistent with the common law we examined earlier on
shared occupation and joint title. Where two or more persons acting together exclusively
occupy land, a possessory title vests in each of them as separate legal persons. 119 In other
words, their shared occupation results in one title that is held by all of them as joint
titleholding entities. The decision of the Court of Claims in Pueblo of San Ildefonso is
like this, the main difference being that the titleholding entities that share the single
Aboriginal title are Indian groups rather than individuals. Also, for a joint possessory title
to arise at common law from shared exclusive occupation, the joint occupiers do not, of
course, have to act as one entity – that is not possible where natural persons are
concerned. In this respect as well, Pueblo of San Ildefonso is more consistent with the
common law than the Strong decision and should guide Canadian courts in deciding joint
title claims.
There is, however, a further issue to consider, namely the nature of the rights held
by the joint Aboriginal titleholders inter se. More specifically, can those rights be
analogized with the common law rights of either joint tenants or tenants in common, or
are they unique? Unfortunately, as we shall see when we examine this issue in Part V.C
below, the American case law is not very helpful in this regard.

V. JOINT ABORIGINAL TITLE IN CANADA
Our discussion so far has revealed that Chief Justice Lamer’s observations in
Delgamuukw that the “meaning of shared exclusivity is well-known to the common law”
and that the “possibility of joint title has been recognized by American courts” are amply
supported by case law in England and the United States.120 In England, common law
occupants and adverse possessors acting in concert could acquire joint title arising from
their exclusive shared occupation of the land in question. Likewise in the United States,
two or more Indian groups who were not closely connected enough to comprise a single
titleholding entity could have joint title to land that they amicably occupied and shared to
the court would also inquire into the composition of the Weber Utes, since they are variously described as
Ute, mixed-blood, and Shoshone.” Although she did not deal with the matter, Nettesheim J thus recognized
the relevance of identification of the landholding group or groups to the issue of joint title.
119
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the exclusion of other Indian groups. It is the latter situation that Lamer CJ and La Forest
J envisaged in Delgamuukw, and that McLachlin CJ accepted as a possibility in
Marshall/Bernard.121 Given, then, that shared exclusivity resulting in joint Aboriginal
title is possible in Canada, I think at least four questions emerge: (1) How does one
identify and define the Aboriginal groups that are claiming joint title? (2) What kind of
relationship would those groups need to have had at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty? (3) How can exclusive shared occupation at that time be proven? (4) What
kinds of interests would each group have in the land as a result of their shared
occupation? As mentioned earlier, I am going to leave question (1) aside in this article, as
it deserves more attention than I can devote to it at this time. My focus will therefore be
on the other three questions.

A. The Relationship Between the Holders of Joint Aboriginal Title

Where the appropriate titleholder is an Aboriginal group comprised of subgroups that are
closely connected politically, culturally, and/or socially, and the larger group was in
exclusive occupation through use and control of the land by the subgroups, Aboriginal
title would vest in the group as a whole.122 Unless a different group with its own legal
personality shared the occupation, joint title would not arise because only one legal entity
would have title. For there to be joint title, two or more Aboriginal groups with distinct
legal personalities must have shared exclusive occupation at the time of Crown
sovereignty.123
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American law on joint title requires that the distinct Aboriginal groups sharing
occupation must have had an amicable relationship.124 Where they were contesting one
another’s occupation, for Aboriginal title to exist a court would either have to find that
one group was in exclusive occupation and members of the other group were trespassers,
or divide the land between the two groups by drawing a boundary between their
respective territories. If neither of these options for unshared Aboriginal title was
available on the facts, neither group would have title.125
The approach to joint title in the United States is consistent with the common law
in England where two or more persons acting together acquire joint title by taking
possession of land as occupants or adverse possessors. Where individuals act in
opposition to one another, however, a court has to decide between them, draw a
boundary, or deny possession and title to either or any of them.126
Given Chief Justice Lamer’s reliance on American law and shared exclusivity in
the common law in envisaging joint Aboriginal title, I expect that the insights we have
been able to draw from those sources would assist in resolving joint title claims in
Canada. However, we have seen that in the United States the timeframe for proving the
occupation on which Aboriginal title depends is “a long time” before the lands were
taken by the United States government, whereas in Canada there is a precise date, namely
assertion of Crown sovereignty.127 In the United States, the relationship between the
Aboriginal groups has thus usually been assessed over a lengthy period of time.128 Given
that a relationship necessarily involves an ongoing connection, the strength of which can
vary over time, I think Canadian courts should likewise assess the nature of the
relationship, in particular the element of amicability, over a period of time leading up to
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Crown assertion of sovereignty. Trying to determine amicability at a precise date is
unrealistic and might lead to a false assessment of an ongoing relationship.
But why is amicability even a requirement? Surely the issue to be determined is
whether two or more Aboriginal groups together made exclusive use of the land and
excluded others who did not have their permission to enter. They could be in exclusive
occupation even if their relationship was not free of conflict. A precedent for this kind of
situation actually existed internationally at the very time and in a geographical area that
included at least part of the territory in question in Delgamuukw. After contesting one
another’s claims to the Pacific Northwest for years after the United States purchased the
territory of Louisiana from France in 1803, the United States and Great Britain agreed in
the Convention of Commerce of 1818 to jointly occupy the area west of the Rocky
Mountains on the north west coast of America that might be claimed by either of them.129
They thereby claimed joint territorial title (without prejudice to their individual claims or
the claims of other powers or states), even though their occupation was anything but
amicable – in fact, they almost went to war over the territory in the 1840s before agreeing
in the 1846 Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty to divide it along the 49th parallel.130
If Britain and the United States could acquire territorial title to the Pacific Northwest
while jointly occupying it from 1818 to 1846 in a way that was anything but amicable,
why could Aboriginal groups having a similar relationship not acquire joint title to lands
in the same area during the same period?131
But where the relationship between the Aboriginal groups in question was
generally amicable, as a preliminary matter it would be necessary to decide on the facts
whether one group had exclusive occupation and members of the other group entered
with permission, in which case the former group would have title and the members of the
latter group would be guests (or licencees, in common law terms).132 Otherwise, if their
129
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occupation was exclusive and truly shared, though not necessarily truly amicable, they
would have joint Aboriginal title. This does not mean that they would have had to occupy
and use the land in the same way. One can envisage situations where they used the land
in different ways, which takes us to the issue of proof.

B. Proving Exclusive Shared Occupation

In Part II, we discussed the test for exclusive occupation established in Delgamuukw and
applied in Tsilhqot’in Nation. In the latter case, Chief Justice McLachlin summarized the
test in this way:
In determining what constitutes sufficient occupation, one looks to the Aboriginal
culture and practices, and compares them in a culturally sensitive way with what
was required at common law to establish title on the basis of occupation.
Occupation sufficient to ground Aboriginal title is not confined to specific sites of
settlement but extends to tracts of land that were regularly used for hunting,
fishing or otherwise exploiting resources and over which the group exercised
effective control at the time of assertion of European sovereignty.133
Regarding the exclusivity requirement, she said “[e]xclusivity should be understood in
the sense of intention and capacity to control the land.”134 As the facts revealed that the
Tsilhqot’in people “repelled other people from their land and demanded permission from
outsiders who wished to pass over it”, McLachlin CJ agreed with the trial judge “that the
Tsilhqot’in treated the land as exclusively theirs” and therefore had title.135
Where two Aboriginal groups claim joint title over an area of land, I think it is a
matter of applying the test for exclusive occupation the Supreme Court has already laid
down to the historical facts as presented. One would take into account the land uses of
both groups over the area claimed, and determine whether they were in control together
to the exclusion of other groups. The necessary control could be shown by presence on
and use of lands, by repelling others or requiring them to obtain permission to enter,
and/or by application of their own laws, for example land tenure laws or laws relating to
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trespass.136 Whether the two groups had joint title would depend on the sum total of all
the evidence relating to their shared use and control of the land.

C. The Interests of Joint Aboriginal Titleholders

The interests the joint titleholders have vis-à-vis the rest of the world would be no
different than the interest of a single Aboriginal group that has unshared Aboriginal
title.137 This interest was described in detail in Delgamuukw in terms reiterated in
Tsilhqot’in Nation, and so a brief summary here will suffice before addressing the more
difficult question of the interests the joint titleholders have in relation to one another.138
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer referred to Aboriginal title as a “right to the
land itself” that is proprietary in nature.139 The titleholders have the right to exclusive
occupation and use of their lands for a variety of purposes that are not limited to
traditional uses that would be the basis for Aboriginal rights apart from title.140 For
example, they have a right to oil and gas, even if they made no use of those resources
prior to Crown acquisition of sovereignty.141 However, Lamer CJ said the permissible
uses are subject to an inherent limit, namely that “they must not be irreconcilable with the
nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the particular group’s
aboriginal title.”142 This limitation, which he said is meant to preserve the titleholders’
special relationship with the land, is one aspect of Aboriginal title that makes it a sui
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generis interest unlike any common law interest in land.143 Other sui generis aspects
distinguishing it from common law interests such as fee simple estates are its source in
pre-Crown sovereignty occupation of land, the fact it is inalienable other than by
surrender to the Crown, and its communal nature.144 Also, the titleholding group has
decision-making authority over their land,145 authority that Justice Williamson in
Campbell v British Columbia held to be governmental in nature and so indicative of an
inherent right of self-government.146
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed Lamer CJ’s
characterization of Aboriginal title as sui generis and agreed with La Forest J’s statement
in Delgamuukw that “Aboriginal title ‘is not equated with fee simple ownership; nor can
it be described with reference to traditional property law concepts’.”147 Regarding its
incidents, she said “Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated
with fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of
enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the
economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the land.”148
While also affirming the inherent limit, she appears to have altered the conception of it by
avoiding Lamer CJ’s characterization of the limit’s purpose as preservation of the land
for the traditional uses that gave rise to the title, describing it more in terms of forwardlooking sustainability. Aboriginal title, she said,
comes with an important restriction – it is collective title held not only for the
present generation but for all succeeding generations. This means it cannot be
alienated except to the Crown or encumbered in ways that would prevent future
generations of the group from using and enjoying it. Nor can the land be
developed or misused in a way that would substantially deprive future generations
143
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of the benefit of the land. Some changes – even permanent changes – to the land
may be possible. Whether a particular use is irreconcilable with the ability of
succeeding generations to benefit from the land will be a matter to be determined
when the issue arises.149
Her emphasis was thus on preserving the land for the benefit of future generations so they
could continue to use it in ways of their own choosing, which might or might not be
traditional uses. “Aboriginal title holders of modern times,” she said, “can use their land
in modern ways, if that is their choice.”150 But she then went a step further, declaring that
the inherent limit also applies to governments that seek to justify infringements of
Aboriginal title.151 This extension of the inherent limit to non-Aboriginal governments is
a significant innovation that could place severe restrictions on the power of those
governments to infringe.
The descriptions of Aboriginal title from Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation do
not assist much in determining the rights of joint Aboriginal titleholders inter se. We
therefore need to turn to the common law on co-ownership of land and American law on
joint Aboriginal title to see if they provide any guidance.
We have seen that in the common law there are two primary forms of coownership: joint tenancy and tenancy in common.152 When vested in possession, they
both entail a right of exclusive occupation and use as against the rest of the world for the
duration of the interest held by the co-owners, as is the case for joint Aboriginal
titleholders.153 This right of occupation and use has a two-fold application. First, it
applies externally to protect the possession of the joint tenants, tenants in common, or
joint Aboriginal titleholders against the outside world.154 It also applies internally to
determine their rights of occupation and use inter se. In this second respect, I think there
may be substantial differences between joint Aboriginal title on the one hand, and joint
tenancy and tenancy in common on the other. For example, in a joint tenancy or tenancy
149
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in common, all the tenants have a right to use all the land in whatever legal ways they
choose, as long as they do not interfere with the occupation and use of their co-tenants.155
This is not necessarily so where joint Aboriginal title is concerned.
While joint Aboriginal title may have some characteristics in common with both
joint tenancies and tenancies in common, it must be kept in mind that it is a sui generis
interest that cannot be equated with any common law interests.156 In a key passage in
Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ stated:
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from
“normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now
develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be
completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property
or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other
aboriginal rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and
aboriginal perspectives.157
He also said he was “cognizant that the sui generis nature of aboriginal title precludes the
application of ‘traditional real property rules’ to elucidate the content of that title”,158
while suggesting that useful analogies can nonetheless be drawn between aspects of
Aboriginal title and common law property attributes.159 McLachlin CJ reiterated these
observations in Tsilhqot’in Nation:
The characteristics of Aboriginal title flow from the special relationship between
the Crown and the Aboriginal group in question. It is this relationship that makes
Aboriginal title sui generis or unique. Aboriginal title is what it is – the unique
product of the historic relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group
in question. Analogies to other forms of property ownership – for example, fee
simple – may help us to understand aspects of Aboriginal title. But they cannot
dictate precisely what it is or is not. ”160
In these passages, Chief Justices Lamer and McLachlin were referring to
Aboriginal title of a single Aboriginal group, not joint Aboriginal title. As already
suggested, these descriptions should nonetheless apply to joint title vis-à-vis the outside
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world. But the Chief Justices’ characterization of Aboriginal title as sui generis also
implies that, whether unshared or joint, the title needs to be considered internally as well
as a unique property interest that has to be defined on its own terms. We therefore should
not expect joint Aboriginal title to conform internally to the common law concepts of
joint tenancy or tenancy in common.
Lamer and McLachlin CJJ have told us that, as Aboriginal title arises from the
historic relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, both their legal systems
have to be taken into account. This is the approach they have taken to defining Aboriginal
title externally. But internally, it seems to me that the common law is not relevant
because control, management, and use of Aboriginal title land is a matter for the
titleholders themselves to determine,161 which must entail self-government and the
application of their own laws.162 Where joint title is concerned, the internal relationship is
between the joint Aboriginal titleholders, not with the Crown. Accordingly, the legal
systems of the Aboriginal titleholders and the interactions of those legal systems should
inform the internal dimensions of joint title. This approach is consistent with the way the
rights of the members of an Aboriginal group having unshared Aboriginal title govern
distribution and use of lands among themselves in accordance with their own internal
laws.163
Where two Aboriginal groups occupied land to the exclusion of all others, their
legal systems might give them different rights of occupation and use of their jointly-held
lands. For example, one group might have rights to hunt and fish, while the other group
might have rights and obligations stemming from a special spiritual connection with the
land that the first group would have to respect. In other instances, their respective rights
of occupation and use might be governed by a treaty or agreement between them,164 as
envisaged by Chief Justice McLachlin in Marshall/Bernard when she stated that “the
common law recognizes that exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that
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recognize shared title to the same parcel of land”.165 As a result, one probably cannot
define the rights of joint Aboriginal titleholders among themselves in a general way.
Definition of their rights depends on the circumstances, including their laws, any
agreements they may have reached, and their patterns of land use.
Other factors also militate against drawing too close an analogy between
Aboriginal title and either joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Two of the sui generis
aspects of Aboriginal title identified by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw are its inalienability
other than by surrender to the Crown,166 and the inherent limit described above. So unlike
joint tenants or tenants in common, Aboriginal joint titleholders cannot transfer their title
to non-Aboriginal persons.167 But what if one group were to surrender its share of joint
Aboriginal title to the Crown, while the other did not? If this were a joint tenancy or
tenancy in common, the result might be that the Crown would become a tenant in
common with the remaining titleholder.168 While this matter cannot be pursued further
here, an equivalent outcome making the Crown and remaining Aboriginal group joint
titleholders probably would not be appropriate, given (among other things) that the
Crown owes fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal titleholders.169
The inherent limit, as conceived by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw, would also have
complicated the situation because, in cases where cooperating Aboriginal groups relied
on different uses to establish their exclusive joint occupation at the time of Crown
sovereignty, the inherent limit might have impacted on their current uses in different
ways. However, McLachlin CJ’s reformulation of the inherent limit in Tsilhqot’in Nation
as forward rather than backward looking, with the goal of maintaining the sustainability
of the land for the benefit of future generations, probably removed, or at least diminished,
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this complication. But in any case, the presence of the inherent limit undoubtedly makes
analogies with joint tenancies and tenancies in common even less viable.
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer also said that the communal nature of
Aboriginal title provides the titleholding community with decision-making authority over
their lands, which “is another feature of aboriginal title which is sui generis and
distinguishes it from normal property interests.”170 We have seen that Justice Williamson,
in the Campbell decision, held that this authority is part of the inherent right of selfgovernment.171 As a result, Aboriginal landholding has public law elements that cannot
be equated with private property interests,172 making it all the more difficult to try to fit
Aboriginal title into a common law mold.173 This is especially evident in the United
States, where the Supreme Court has acknowledged since the 1820s that the Indian
nations’ land rights are territorial in the sense of encompassing governmental authority as
well as property rights.174
In Johnson v M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Indian
nations were completely independent and owned the lands within their territories prior to
European colonization.175 After colonization and later inclusion within the United States,
they retained governmental authority as well as land rights within the territories they
continued to possess as “domestic dependent nations”.176 Their Aboriginal title therefore
has always had a governmental dimension, as the “Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial”.177 This is still the
case today, subject to diminution of their residual sovereignty and land rights by treaties
with the United States, Acts of Congress, and judicial decisions that have limited their
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authority over non-members.178 As a result, subject to some exceptions, property rights
within Indian territories (now generally referred to as “Indian country”) continue to be
delineated and governed by the internal laws of the Indian nations themselves.179
However, while the Indian nations can make laws for the creation of property rights
within their territories, they can only alienate their collectively-held lands so as to remove
them from their territory and jurisdiction by surrendering them to the United States.180
Indian nations in the United States therefore have always exercised governmental
authority over their retained Aboriginal title lands. Where two nations had joint
Aboriginal title, this authority would have been shared between them, probably with each
nation commonly exercising authority over its own members and their activities on the
land, though treaties between the two nations could have provided different arrangements
for sharing jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the American cases on joint title that I have
looked at do not discuss this issue of shared authority, no doubt because the matter before
the ICC and the courts reviewing its decisions was whether compensation should be paid
for wrongful or unfair taking of Indian lands in the past, not how governmental authority
had been shared by joint titleholders. It is thus hardly surprising that this issue never
seems to have been addressed.
Nor do the American decisions relating to joint title provide much guidance on
the interests of the titleholding group inter se, again because the issue to be decided was
monetary compensation for wrongful or unfair taking, not determination of the rights of
the joint titleholders vis-à-vis one another. In Pueblo of San Ildefonso,181 we have seen
that the Court of Claims upheld the decision of the ICC that the Pueblos of Santo
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Domingo and San Filipe had joint Aboriginal title to an 8600-acre tract of land in New
Mexico when the United States extinguished the one-half interest of the Santo Domingo
Pueblo in 1902 by including the tract in a reservation for the exclusive use of the San
Filipe Pueblo. The joint title lands were contiguous to lands that had been granted by the
Spanish Crown to the two Pueblos in 1770 as pasture and woodlands, on terms that “they
shall be common to both of the aforesaid Pueblos, equally and without any
preference”.182 As the Pueblos honestly (though mistakenly) believed the joint title lands
had been included in the grant and they had amicably shared use of those lands on the
same basis as the granted lands since 1770, the Court of Claims agreed with the ICC’s
conclusion that “the Pueblo of Santo Domingo is entitled to recover compensation from
the United States in an amount equal to one-half of the fair market value of the 8,600
acres as of June 13, 1902.”183 While finding an equal interest in the joint title lands, this
decision was obviously based on the unique circumstances that equated that interest with
the interest to the contiguous lands granted in 1770, and so it cannot serve as a precedent
to determine the interests of other joint titleholders inter se.184 The correct approach
therefore must be to determine those interests on the basis of the particular facts and
internal legal arrangements of the titleholders themselves, including their laws and any
agreements they may have governing their relationship.
To conclude, I think the rights of joint Aboriginal titleholders among themselves
will vary, depending on relevant Aboriginal laws, Aboriginal treaties or agreements, and
patterns of land use. Apart from the exclusive and undivided right of possession as
against the whole world that joint tenants, tenants in common, and joint Aboriginal
titleholders all have, I do not think that the rules governing joint tenancies and tenancies

182

Ibid at 1392.
Ibid.
184
In situations where a single titleholding entity was made up of subgroups, for the purpose of distributing
compensation awarded by the ICC it appears that the subgroups could enjoy unequal shares in the title of
the larger entity: see Sioux Tribe, supra note 96 at 478; Strong, supra note 81 at 572. In Sioux Tribe, the
Court of Claims indicated that the proper approach would be to distribute the compensation proportionally
to the number of individuals from each subgroup that were actually occupying and using the land prior to
the taking: ibid at 467-68. However, as this case does not appear to involve joint title as such (see note 96
supra), one should be cautious about applying it to joint title claims. Also, the matter of dividing up the
interest of a larger titleholding entity usually seems to have arisen when the larger entity subsequently split
into separate groups: see Strong at 572. See also Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 72 at 954, where Davis
J explained that “the ancestral group ‘owns’ the claim, and present-day Indian groups are before the
Commission only on behalf of the ancestral entity.”
183

37
in common are of much relevance to joint Aboriginal title. Instead, the rules governing
joint Aboriginal title will have to be formulated by taking into account the various sui
generis aspects of Aboriginal title, including inalienability, the inherent limit, and the
title’s communal nature and governmental dimensions. Any general rules that are
developed in the context of those sui generis aspects will then have to adapted to the
particular circumstances of the Aboriginal groups who hold joint title.
VI. CONCLUSION

Where Aboriginal title claims overlap, we have identified three possible way of resolving
the matter. First, on the basis of historical patterns of land use, exercise of control, and
the Aboriginal laws of the groups claiming title, a court could divide up the land by
drawing a boundary. Secondly, where a boundary could not be drawn and the groups
were in conflict over the lands historically to the extent that they did not have shared
exclusive occupation, a court would probably have to conclude that neither or none of
them has Aboriginal title (though they could have Aboriginal rights apart from title in the
disputed area185). Thirdly, if no group was in occupation to the exclusion of the other
group or groups, but they shared exclusive occupation and use among themselves, they
could have joint Aboriginal title. Proof of joint title would entail the same kind of
evidence required to prove unshared Aboriginal title, demonstrating that together the
groups exclusively occupied the land by exercising control over it and excluding others.
However, they would not have to show that their relationship was such that they formed
one group, as that would result in unshared title that would be vested in that group as a
single titleholding entity,186 in which case there would be no overlap and no joint title.
Genuine joint title involves different Aboriginal groups with distinct legal personalities
that share title to the same land.
Aboriginal title, whether unshared or joint, has external and internal dimensions.
The external dimensions determine the relationship of the titleholders with the outside
world, whereas the internal dimensions determine the relationship of the titleholders
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among themselves. Looking outward, the relationship of unshared and joint Aboriginal
titleholders with the rest of the world should be the same: in each case, they are entitled
to occupation, use, benefit, and control of the land vis-à-vis everyone else.187 Looking
inward, the rights of the members of a group that has unshared Aboriginal title are
determined by the practices and laws of that group. Similarly, the internal rights of joint
titleholders are determined as between the joint titleholding groups by their own patterns
of land use, their own laws, and any agreements they may have reached governing their
relationship. Within each group, however, the rights of the members of that group inter se
would be determined by the group’s own practices and laws. So in a joint title situation,
there are two levels of legal orders governing internal rights to the land: the legal order as
between the titleholding groups, and the legal orders of each of those groups that
determine the rights and obligations of their members.
The application of Aboriginal laws internally is one feature of Aboriginal title that
makes it truly unique and unlike any common law interest in land. Where joint
Aboriginal title is concerned, this unique feature necessarily excludes the internal
application of common law principles and rules governing co-ownership. Joint tenants
and tenants in common do not have their own legal orders governing their relationship,188
whereas Aboriginal titleholders do. This feature of Aboriginal title also means that the
internal aspects of joint title will vary from one instance to another, depending on the
laws and agreements of the Aboriginal groups who share the title. So while the external
aspects of joint Aboriginal title should not vary, the internal aspects will have to be
determined by examination of the titleholders’ legal orders, which like all legal orders
cannot be static – they must be subject to change by the titleholding groups through the
exercise of their governmental authority.189
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